Research Grant
[Cite as https://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DE140101014]Researchers: Tom Wilkening (Discovery Early Career Researcher Award)
Brief description Extending economic design to non-market settings: An experimental study of mechanism design with intention-based preferences. Mechanism design is the engineering side of economic theory, which starts with assumptions regarding human nature and builds economic systems to best maximise efficiency according to these assumptions. This project studies mechanism design in experimental settings where individuals exhibit a desire to be kind to those who have been kind to them and unkind to those who have not. Such preferences are common in many non-market settings and can have dramatic effects on the efficiency of potential mechanisms. The ultimate goal of this project is to develop applied mechanisms that are robust to heterogeneity in such intention-based preferences and which can be used in bilateral exchange, contract design and many other non-market settings.
Funding Amount $349,785
Funding Scheme Discovery Early Career Researcher Award
- PURL : https://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DE140101014
- ARC : DE140101014